ForceBridge
Last changed 2026-10-10 · Score recalculated — Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 20 → 50. Problems weighed by who is responsible: the subject's own conduct −8, incidents the subject suffered −3.2, problems around the subject, caused by others −3.2, concerns that are not fraud −3.2; legitimacy credit long-running +8; no longer operating, so capped at 50. Version history →
Why this score
| Every page starts at | 65 |
| The subject's own conduct | -8 |
| Concerns that are not fraud | -3.2 |
| Incidents it suffered (e.g. hacks) | -3.2 |
| Problems around it, caused by others | -3.2 |
| Long-running | +8 |
| Sum | 55 |
- No longer operating, so capped at 50.
Score: 50/100 (kept between 0 and 100)
How scoring works →Summary
ForceBridge is a cross-chain bridge operated by Magickbase on the Nervos Network (CKB), enabling transfers between Nervos and Ethereum and BNB Chain. On June 2, 2025, the bridge was exploited via an access control vulnerability — likely a compromised private key — resulting in approximately $3.7–3.9 million in user funds being stolen and laundered through Tornado Cash. The exploit occurred just one day after Magickbase announced the bridge's sunset, raising questions about the timing and origin of the attack.
Connected Entities
7 entities · 60 linked investigations- ZachXBT→mentioned with→Ethereum(70%)
- ZachXBT→mentioned with→Binance(60%)
- Binance→mentioned with→Ethereum(65%)
- ForceBridge→mentioned with→Polkadot(60%)
- ForceBridge→mentioned with→Cardano(60%)
- ForceBridge→mentioned with→Ethereum(70%)
- ForceBridge→mentioned with→Binance(60%)
- ForceBridge→mentioned with→FixedFloat(70%)
- ForceBridge→mentioned with→ZachXBT(60%)
- Polkadot→mentioned with→Ethereum(65%)
- + 4 more
Connected Through
6 shared actors · 636 investigationsDistinct actors this investigation shares with others — holders, traders, and named parties. Shared infrastructure (exchanges, pools) is excluded.
- □Ethereumorganization
- □Binanceorganization
- □ZachXBTorganization
- ⌂FixedFloatprotocol
Timeline(8 events)
14 October 2021
ForceBridge launches on Nervos Network mainnet, enabling cross-chain transfers between CKB, Ethereum, Cardano, and Polkadot.
31 May 2025
Magickbase announces the sunset of ForceBridge and Godwoken, citing low user activity and high maintenance costs. Six-month withdrawal window announced.
2 June 2025
ForceBridge exploited via access control vulnerability (likely compromised private key). Approximately $3.7–3.9 million in ETH, USDC, USDT, DAI, and WBTC stolen across Ethereum and BNB Chain.
2 June 2025
Cyvers Alerts first detects and reports suspicious activity involving ForceBridge on X.
2 June 2025
Magickbase pauses all ForceBridge bridge contracts and announces investigation. Stolen funds are laundered through Tornado Cash and FixedFloat.
2 June 2025
Magickbase publicly discloses $3.7 million in affected funds and announces cooperation with law enforcement and partner exchanges.
2 June 2025
Halborn Security publishes technical post-mortem attributing hack to access control failure, noting suspicious timing relative to sunset announcement.
16 January 2026
Extended deadline for user withdrawals from Force Bridge. Remaining funds to be held in Magickbase custody.
Decision Log
- slot 455359355 · hash bDkFWudczk3Cu4sUmGzrSdLZ6trdv9PhcHQ2bBuYB2v
- slot 422573680 · hash Ecdc34zsfGL6RpmgtihMaBFgFJVMga63SMzpD6YJrt1Z
This investigation is cryptographically anchored to the Solana blockchain (2 decisions). 14 of 15 cited source URLs have an Internet Archive snapshot.
model: claude-sonnet-4-6
generated: 5/4/2026, 2:54:23 AM
last updated: 10/10/2026, 6:40:43 PM
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